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Limiting Attorney's Fees in Black
Lung Benefits Cases: A Violation of
Procedural Due Process?
INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 1985, the United States Supreme Court, in
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,I upheld
the constitutionality of a statute limiting to ten dollars the total
fee that may be paid to an attorney or agent representing a
veteran seeking benefits from the Veteran's Administration (VA)
for service-connected death or disability.2 This statute was chal-
lenged by veterans who felt that the fee limitation effectively
precluded them from obtaining legal representation in violation
of their procedural due process rights as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.' The veterans claimed that the low level of the fee
which could be paid to an attorney had the result of eliminating
any hope of securing legal counsel in a veteran's benefit case on
a regular basis.
4
In another area of benefit proceedings a trend is developing
that could give rise to an argument that is very similar to the
one voiced by the veterans in Walters. In black lung proceedings
attorneys' fee requests are facing drastic reductions and the
practical effect is that fewer attorneys are taking such cases and
the availability of representation for black lung claimants is
being threatened.'
This comment will explore the reasoning behind Walters and
look at the possible repercussions it may have on government
I Waiters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180 (1985), rev'g,
589 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984) [hereinafter Walters].
Id.
Id. (The plaintiffs also raised a First Amendment claim, but the focus of this
comment is on the Fifth Amendment claim.).
4Id.
I See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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control of attorneys' fees in black lung benefit cases. The focus
will be on the arguments put forth by the veterans and the
possible application of the majority's reasoning to a claim by
black lung claimants that they are effectively being precluded
from adequate counsel in violation of their rights.
I. THE VETERANS CASE
A. Background
On July 14, 1862, Congress prescribed the fees that could
be charged by agents or attorneys for filing and establishing
claims for pensions, bounties or other allowances on behalf of
veterans. 6 Congress also provided that any agent or attorney in
such a case who demanded or received any greater compensation
than the act allowed would be deemed guilty of a high misde-
meanor. 7 Two years later, Congress passed a supplemental act
allowing agents or attorneys the fixed sum of ten dollars, re-
gardless of the amount of time expended on the representation.8
In passing this law, Congress was influenced by the paternalistic
motive of keeping the money in the hands of the beneficiaries 9
and out of the pockets of "unscrupulous" attorneys.I0 Attorneys
were accused of taking advantage of veterans by retaining an
unwarranted portion of the award in compensation for very
limited legal assistance. I1
The present day version of the fee limitation law has changed
very little. Attorneys or agents may be employed to bring a claim
6 United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 353 (1878) (Hall, in part, involved the
question of the validity and constitutionality of the ten dollar fee limitation and this
Court found such to be a valid exercise under the Constitution.).
'Id.
Id. See generally Walters, 105 S.Ct. at 3210 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (the ten
dollar fee then is roughly the equivalent of a $580 fee today).
I Hall, 98 U.S. at 354-56.
10 S. Rep. No. 499, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, at 50 (1982) (This report was filed
in response to a committee bill which proposed opening up the decisions of the Board
of Veteran's Appeals (BVA) to judicial review, a practice which had previously been




on behalf of a veteran, 2 but the fee for such efforts is still
limited to ten dollars for any one claim. 3 In addition, anyone
violating this provision will be fined not more than five hundred
dollars and/or imprisoned at hard labor for not more than two
years. 14 2
These provisions, with their qualifications and guidelines,
were at the heart of the issue in Walters. 5 This case was an
appeal from a district court decision granting a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the fee limitation law.'
6
The plaintiffs contended that the fee limitation denied veterans
any realistic opportunity to obtain legal representation in pre-
senting their claim to the VA, thereby depriving them of their
right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment.
17
B. The Mathews Test
In weighing the veterans' interests, the Walters Court used
the standard by which violations of procedural due process are
measured as developed in Mathews v. Eldridge."' Mathews in-
volved a person whose social security disability benefits had been
terminated. 9 The claimant brought an action "challenging the
,1 38 U.S.C. § 3404(a) (1982) (before being recognized, attorneys or agents may
be called upon to "show that they are of good moral character and in good repute, are
qualified to render claimants valuable service, and otherwise are competent to assist
claimants").
'1 Id. at § 3404(c)(2).
14 38 U.S.C. § 3405 (1982) (this can be done by soliciting, contracting for, charging,
or receiving in excess of the ten dollar limit, or attempting to do such).
11 105 S.Ct. 3180. For a description of the procedure which veterans must follow
see id. at 3183-84.
16 See National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985) (The District Court recognized that two previous
decisions, Gendron v. Saxbe, 389 F. Supp. 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd per curiam sub
nom, Gendron v. Levi, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), and Demarest v. United States, 718 F.2d
964 (9th Cir. 1983), upheld the limitation to be constitutional. The District Court noted
that Gendron rested upon one of two grounds on which the Supreme Court granted
summary affirmance, and Demarest based its decision on the ruling in Gendron; thus
there was no res judicata effect since it was not clear upon which conclusion Gendron
based its decision.).
17 National Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. at 1306 (the plaintiffs were two veterans organi-
zations, three individual veterans, and a veteran's widow).
" 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
19 Id.
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constitutional validity of the administrative procedures estab-
lished by the Secretary of HEW for assessing whether there
exists a continuing disability.' '20 A Federal District Court deter-
mined that the administrative procedures in question were un-
constitutional. 2' On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court held
that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to termination
of disability benefits and that the existing administrative proce-
dures for such termination fully comports with due process.
22
In arriving at this conclusion the Supreme Court noted that,
"[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances;'" rather it "calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." ' 24 The Court felt that resolution
of the issue required analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected. 25 In considering these interests, the
Court applied a test which requires consideration of three distinct
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 26
C. The Walters Court's Decision
The Walters Court, like previous courts, 27 applied the Ma-
thews test to determine if the fee limitation was a violation of
2o Id. at 324-25 (plaintiff sought an immediate reinstatement of benefits pending
a hearing on the issue of his disability).
21 Id.
= Id.
23 Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Worker v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [1961]).




27 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (inmate claimed that prison
officials' actions in confining him to administrative segregation violated his rights under
1987] ATTORNEYS' FEES
procedural due process. 28 However, the Court also considered
the additional element of deference owed to Congress in light
of the longevity of the limitation 29 and the previous action Con-
gress had taken on the subject.30
Initially, the Court turned its attention to the government
interest involved. First, the Court reiterated the paternalistic
motive of protecting the veterans' benefits.31 Then, the Court
endorsed the desirability of an informal and nonadversarial sys-
tem for handling VA claims.3 2 According to the Court, the
introduction of attorneys into the proceedings would be unlikely
to further this goal.33 In fact, the Court stated that if compen-
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754
(1982) (parents challenging New York Family Court action ruling for permanent termi-
nation of their right); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (indigent suing to have
state pay for his blood test in a paternity suit); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10
(1979) (driver lost his license for failure to submit to a breath-analysis test); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (claim that Georgia's procedures for voluntary commit-
ment of children under the age of 18 to state mental hospitals violated due process);
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 (1977) (truck driver challenged constitutionality of an
Illinois statute which authorized the revocation of a license upon showing that driver's
conduct falls into any of the 18 enumerated categories). Each case employed the Mathews
test.
. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3189.
29 Id. at 3190 (the Court made special note of the fact that the provision was 123
years old). But see id. at 3214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("The age of the statute cuts
against, not in favor of, its validity." The passage of time "[h]as effectively eroded the
one legitimate justification that formerly made the legislation rational"-unscrupulous
attorneys.).
30 See supra note 10 (Congress had the issue before them in 1982 and let it die in
a House Committee.).
11 Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3190 (This goes back to the idea of the unscrupulous
attorney that was put forth in Hall, see supra text accompanying notes 9 and 10, and
the 1982 Senate Report.). But see S. Rep. No. 499, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 50 (1982)
(recognizing that in light of the widespread network of local bar associations that now
generally police attorney behavior, this position is no longer tenable).
32 Id. at 3191.
11 Id. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974) (noting that
the use of counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings would "inevitably give the pro-
ceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further
correctional goals"); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (Dealing with
attorneys in probation revocation proceedings, the Court stated that "the decision-
making process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State for appointed
counsel, . . . a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review will not be insub-
stantial."); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1288 (1975)
("The result may be to turn what might have been a short conference leading to an
amicable result into a protracted controversy.").
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sated attorneys were allowed into the process, "the day might
come when it could be said that an attorney might indeed be
necessary to present a claim properly in a system rendered more
adversary and more complex by the very presence of lawyer
representation. ' 3 4 The Court concluded that "great weight" must
be accorded the government interest at stake.
35
Next, the Court analyzed the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the private interest and the potential of reducing any such
error through the proposed introduction of attorneys into the
process.36 In concluding that attorneys would add no procedural
safeguard, the Court relied on statistics showing that those vet-
erans represented by counsel have only a slightly higher success
rate than veterans represented by non-attorneys or veterans who
represented themselves. 37 In addition, the Court said that the
availability of attorneys in the ordinary case had not been shown
to lead to a likelihood of reduction in errors.' According to the
Court, "[njeither the difference in the success rate nor the ex-
istence of complexity in some cases is sufficient to warrant a
conclusion that the right to retain and compensate an attorney
in VA cases is a necessary element of procedural fairness under
the Fifth Amendment. ,
39
Finally, the Court weighed the importance of the private
interests affected by the official action.40 The Court recognized
previous cases in which it had held that the liberty interest
Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3192.
35 Id.
1, Id. at 3192-93.
17 Id. at 3192-95 (The statistics cited show that veterans represented by attorneys
or agents have a 18.3% success rate before the BVA, while those represented by non-
attorneys have a 15.80 success rate, and those who have no representation a 15.2%
success rate.).
38 See id. at 3194-95. But cf. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters,
589 F. Supp. at 1310 (The District Court was impressed by the complexity of cases
involving Agent Orange, exposure to radiation, and post-traumatic stress syndrome.).
19 Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3195 (The Court seems to feel that the rare, exceptional
cases don't warrant the safeguards because the process works in the generality of cases.).
Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979) ("As the scope of governmental
action expands into new areas creating new controversies for judicial review, it is
incumbent on the courts to design procedures that protect the rights of the individual
without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult social
problems.").
, Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3195.
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involved was sufficient to justify the right to counsel, 41 but the
Court distinguished the present factual situation. First, the Court
reasoned that the only present interest protected by the Due
Process Clause was a property interest,42 which in this case was
not of sufficient importance to warrant a right to counsel.
4
1
Second, the Court reasoned that the claimant does not depend
on the payments for their daily subsistence, since the benefits at
stake in VA proceedings are not granted on the basis of need,
but on the basis of eligibility." Third, the Court further distin-
guished the case on the ground that VA proceedings are non-
adversarial in nature and that counsel has not been guaranteed
in various other proceedings that do not approximate trials.
45
II. THE DANGEROUS PRECEDENT OF Walters
A. Expansion into Black Lung Benefits
At the heart of the Walters decision is a paternalistic motive4
and the desire to keep the procedure as informal and non-
adversarial as possible. 47 The danger behind this rationale is that
it could be used to support the reduction or even elimination of
attorneys' fees in other administrative proceedings involving gov-
ernment benefits. In fact, the Walters Court quoted with ap-
proval a legal commentator, who questioned, "[w]hether we
would not do better to abandon the adversary system in certain
"1 See Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778 (The Court held one charged with probation violation
may be entitled to counsel because of the liberty interest involved.); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (which was relied upon by the appellees since it held that a welfare
recipient subject to possible termination of benefits had a right to be represented by
counsel).
42 Walters, 105 U.S. at 3195.
41 Id. (The Court felt that the welfare benefits in Goldberg were distinguishable
from the Veterans' benefits since "the recipients in Goldberg depended [upon payment]
for their daily subsistence.").
" Id. at 3195-96 (The Court was following a distinction made in Mathews, that
eligibility for disability benefits, unlike welfare benefits, is not based on financial need
and, since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability
entitlement decision, which turns primarily on medical evidence, the requirements of
procedural due process are not the same.).
Id. at 3196.
" See supra note 31.
41 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
1987]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY [VOL. 2:375
areas of mass justice." '4 8 Support of such a principle endangers
the public's right to representation by an attorney in other
benefit proceedings where attorneys' fee limitations are en-
acted. 49 An attempt may be made to use the reasoning from
Walters to defeat a due process challenge based upon the prac-
tical effect of eliminating counsel when in fact the case does not
stand for such a general principle. The facts of Walters and the
ensuing legal discussion make it clear that its situation was but
a narrow factual occurrence that should not have application in
all areas of benefit proceedings.
One area where the rationale of Walters has no justifiable
application and should not preclude a due process challenge is
in black lung benefit proceedings. In this area a federal statute
grants the government the authority to allow representative coun-
sel a "reasonable fee," 50 while accompanying regulations provide
that "[n]o fee charged for representation . . . shall be valid
unless approved under this subpart. No contract or prior agree-
ment for a fee shall be valid . ..."I' These regulations further
prescribe the application process that attorneys must follow in
applying for their fees and the factors the federal authority
considers when setting a reasonable rate.52 On their face these
provisions present no problem with obtaining reasonable attor-
neys' fees, but in practice this is not always the result.53
When an attorney in a black lung case submits a fee appli-
cation, it is reviewed under a "necessary" standard: work is
41 Friendly, supra note 33, at 1289.
41 While there are many areas where the government regulates and limits attorneys'
fees, for purposes of this Comment the focus will be on black lung benefits cases because
of the severe cuts that have occurred in attorneys' fees and the importance of this area
to Kentucky practitioners.
o 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982).
" 20 C.F.R. § 725.365 (1986).
52 20 C.F.R. § 725.366 (1986). See generally Coleman v. Director, 5 B.L.R. 1-35
(1982); Sagle v. Director, 3 B.L.R. 1-750 (1981) (both cases demonstrate this procedure).
11 There have been constant attacks on these provisions due to the reductions in
fees that take place routinely. See McKee v. Director, 6 B.L.R. 1-233 (1983) (court
rejected claim that reduction in requested hours constituted an unlawful interference
with the practice of law); Potter v. Director, 4 B.L.R. 1-197 (1981) (board rejected
contention that a showing of fraud constituted the sole valid basis for reducing the
requested number of compensable hours in the fee award); Cocke v. Director, 3 B.L.R.
1-799 (1981) (board rejected unlawful interference claim, fraud claim, and a claim that
the flat-rate fee award policy is unreasonable).
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considered necessary if at the time it was performed the attorney
reasonably considered the work necessary to establish entitle-
ment.14 The awarding of fees is discretionary and will not be set
aside upon appeal unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law.55
Under this process, attorneys routinely face rejection of their
fee request or severe reductions in either the hourly rate granted
or in the number of compensable hours allowed.16 Even when a
court grants attorneys their requested fees, it is often after a
lengthy process requiring a submission of a fee request, an
appeal of the initial decision, and then a return to the first
forum on remand.5 7 Consequently, many attorneys are reluctant
to accept a black lung case, and others will not take them at
all. 8 If this practice continues, adequate representation will not
be available for black lung claimants due to governmental action,
giving rise to a potential violation of due process.5 9
14 Marcum v. Director, 2 B.L.R. 1-894, 1-901 (1980).
11 Id. at 1-896.
56 See generally Esselstein v. Director, 676 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1982) (court
reduced requested rate from $100 to $65 per hour, saying co-counsel work was routine);
Elkins v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 1981)
(court denied attorney's fee in part because attorney had not complied with established
procedures for an award); Maloney v. Director, 4 B.L.R. 1-711 (1982) (court reduced
hourly rate from $100 to $65 per hour); Calhoun v. Director, 3 B.L.R. 1-812 (1981)
(court was hearing an appeal from a decision reducing an attorney's requested fee of
$3737 to an award of $50); Courier-Journal, July 13, 1980, at Al, col. 4 (quoting
attorneys who have had claims reduced: requested $1530.60, award $0.00; requested 35
1/2 hours, award $0.00; requested $2225, award $0.00; requested $4000, award $170;
requested 40 hours, award $432.60).
17 See Hrutkay v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 5 B.L.R. 3-4 (1982); Potter, 4 B.L.R.
1-197; Calhoun, 3 B.L.R. 1-812; Cocke, 3 B.L.R. 1-799; Sagle, 3 B.L.R. 1-750.
58 See generally Courier-Journal, July 13, 1980 at B4, col. 2 (The paper notes that
attorneys are no longer handling the claims or, at least, they are screening the ones they
handle very carefully.); Courier-Journal (Indiana Edition), June 25, 1985, at B3, col. 2
(Quoting a coal miner whose claim took five years to work through the system: "you
can't get an attorney because it takes so long for him to get his pay." The miner made
the statement as he testified before a congressional subcommittee.).
19 Cf. Linnell, Choate & Weber v. Heyde, 330 F. Supp. 170 (D. Maine 1971) (This
case involved a petition for review of an award of attorneys' fees made by respondent
in a compensation order awarding benefits under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. section 901. Petitioners were awarded fees of
$950, later increased to $1450 for 48 hours work. The court found this award "wholly
inadequate" and raised it to $2500, plus expenses of $675.93 saying "that claimants will
be unable to obtain the services of competent counsel unless the attorney's fees to be
paid are reasonably compensatory of the services rendered.").
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B. Black Lung Representation and The Mathews Test
Determining if a black lung claimant's interest is of such
importance that it should be allowed due process protection
involves a two-step analysis. 60 First, the court must decide if
there is a property interest sufficient to require due process
protection. 61 Secondly, employing the Mathews test, the court
must determine what process is due prior to the denial of ben-
efits .62
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 63 the Supreme Court an-
nounced what is required for a person to have a property interest
in a benefit:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined .64
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individ-
ual against arbitrary action of the government." ' 65 Whether any
procedural protections are required depends not on whether
governmental benefits are characterized as a "right" or as a
"privilege," but whether individuals will be condemned to suffer
grievous loss.
66
Under these standards, black lung claimants clearly possess
a property interest of sufficient magnitude to invoke due process
- Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 1980) (case involving veterans'
educational assistance).
I6 d. at 1086. The emphasis is on the applicants' rights to due process, not the
attorneys'. The courts have held that the rejection of the fees agreed upon between
themselves and their clients by the Social Security Administration does not constitute a
denial of due process from the attorney's point-of-view. E.g., Thomason v. Schweiker,
692 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1982); Copaken v. Secretary of HEW, 590 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
1979); Pepe v. Schweiker, 565 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Byrd v. Harris, 509 F.
Supp. 1222 (E.D. Tenn. 1981), aff'd, 701 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1982).
62 Devine, 616 F.2d at 1086; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
63 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Id. at 577.
65 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
6 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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protection. 67 The legitimacy of an alleged interest does not de-
pend upon whether the person has previously been receiving the
desired benefit, 68 but upon a comparison of the nature of an
individual's interest in the benefit and consequences of its denial
with public considerations for withholding that right. 69 In the
case of black lung claimants, arbitrary denial of their benefits
could leave them with an "uncompensated disability of lifelong
duration. "70
The next step is to employ the Mathews test to determine
the extent of protection due a class prior to a denial of benefits,
7'
with the first factor being the private interest that will be affected
by the official action. 72 In Walters, the Court made the distinc-
tion between benefits which are granted on the basis of need
73
and benefits which are granted because an applicant meets the
eligibility requirements. 74 The Court felt that the former are more
deserving of due process protection than the latter, 75 and thus
held that the victims were not entitled to employ counsel since
their benefits were likened to the social security benefits in
Mathews (eligibility) and not the welfare benefits in Goldberg
67 Cf. Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
housing applicant had a constitutionally protected property interest in benefits by virtue
of her membership in a class of individuals whom the housing provisions were intended
to serve); Devine, 616 F.2d at 1086 (court found that veterans applying for educational
assistance have a property interest that deserves due process protection); Davis v. United
States, 415 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Kan. 1976) (holding that a former federal prison
inmate possessed property interest of sufficient magnitude to invoke protection of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, even though he had not yet been adjudged
entitled to receive benefits under the regulatory scheme, for injuries allegedly suffered
as consequence of his employment within federal prison hospital).
68 Davis, 415 F. Supp. at 1095.
69 Id. at 1096-97.
70 Cf. id. at 1091.
71 See supra text accompanying note 62.
11 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
73 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 3195-96
(1985) (The Court was referring to their decision in Goldberg where they held that a
welfare recipient subject to possible termination of benefits was entitled to be represented
by an attorney.).
74 Id. (The court was referring to their decision in Mathews which held that a
claimant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability
benefits. However, in this case the present system did allow for a hearing prior to such
a denial becoming final, just not at the beginning of the process.).
75 Id.
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(need). 76 However, in light of the seriousness of the affliction
under which black lung claimants suffer, 77 it is clear that their
situation is more closely analogous to Goldberg than to Mathews
or Walters. The Goldberg court stated that "the crucial factor
. . . is that termination of aid pending resolution of a contro-
versy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very
means by which to live while he waits .... *"78 In the black lung
situation, Congress has found that a significant number of coal
miners are not only partially disabled, but are totally or fatally
disabled from black lung due to employment in underground
coal mines.79 Thus, in many cases, the black lung claimants',
like the welfare recipients', ability to seek redress is adversely
affected because of their need to concentrate upon finding a
means of daily subsistence0 and proper medical care. The black
lung claimant has a sufficient private interest to warrant a right
to be represented by an attorney and such a right should not be
lightly dismissed. 81
The second factor is the "risk of erroneous deprivation of
[the private] interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards. '8 2 In the case of black lung applicants we are not
looking at an additional procedural safeguard, rather we are
faced with the elimination of one already in place -- represent-
ative counsel.83 It is counsel who develops the record so as to
entitle a claimant to benefits, and without this representation
the risk of erroneous deprivation would be high.
84
76 Id.
See generally Courier-Journal (Indiana Edition), June 25, 1985, at B3, col. 2
(Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd, D-W. Va. speaking on the ravages of black
lung disease, "I've seen them as they sat up at night in a rocking chair-that's how
they had to sleep. They couldn't lie down."); Courier-Journal, July 13, 1980, at B4,
col. 2 (Black Lung is a permanent respiratory problem caused by prolonged breathing
of coal dust.).
78 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
79 Meiser, The Black Lung Benefits Act, 17 Forum 813 (1982).
,0 See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
1 See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("IT]he citizen's right
to consult an independent lawyer and to retain that lawyer to speak on his or her behalf
is an aspect of liberty that is priceless.").
82 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
13 See supra notes 56-58.
'" See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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The last factor is the "[gjovernment's interest, including...
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirements would entail." 5 Administrative
efficiency cannot justify a rule that indirectly prohibits counsel
by discouraging their participation.8 6 In many cases, the right to
be heard is meaningless if it does not include the right to be
heard with the assistance of legal counsel.8 7 Counsel can "help
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly
manner, conduct cross-examinations, and generally safeguard the
interest of the recipient."88s This is especially true in black lung
proceedings when one considers the nature and complexity of
the issues to be presented. 9 Furthermore, the presence of counsel
does not constitute an additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement, but is merely a continuation of past practice. 90
In the Walters case the government interest was comprised
of a paternalistic motive9 coupled with the desire to maintain a
procedure that was both informal and non-adversarial. 92 In the
case of black lung benefits, the government's interest is to see
that claimants receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 93
The presence of attorneys in no way interferes with this purpose.
Counsel serves the much needed function of aiding the claimant
by developing the record to the degree necessary to qualify the
claimant for the benefits that are due him. 94 In addition, for the
85 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (speaking here on the
practical effect of the VA's ten dollar fee limitation).
87 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270-71 (recognizing the importance of an attorney to a
welfare recipient's case).
88 Id. at 271; see also National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F.
Supp. 1302, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (attorneys could gather evidence, find witnesses,
obtain expert testimony and reports, and present all in the needed fashion).
89 Cf. National Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. at 1315-16 (The relationship between the
importance of an attorney and the risk of erroneous deprivation generally rests on the
importance of the interest at stake, the nature and complexity of the issues to be
presented, and the likely ability of the person involved to be able to present such issues.).
90 See supra text accompanying note 83.
91 See supra note 31 (again, the Senate notes that this motive is no longer tenable).
92 See supra text accompanying note 31 (This motive has no application here in
light of the presence of, and need for, attorneys already in the process.).
91 See Director v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 598 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1979);
Hopkins v. Gardner, 374 F.2d. 726, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other ground sub
nom, Hopkins v. Cohen, 390 U.S. 530 (1968).
1 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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most part, the attorney's fee is not taken out of the claimant's
benefits, 95 but is paid either by the employer6 or by the black
lung trust fund. 97 It is obvious that the government's interest in
black lung cases is not put in jeopardy by the presence of legal
advocates.
When considering the black lung claimant's right to counsel
under the Mathews test, it is clear that such a right is mandated
by due process. The claimant has an important private interest
that is adversely affected by the government's action in limiting
attorneys' fees. 98 Obviously, the risk of erroneous deprivation to
the claimant's rights if counsel is removed from the process is
great,99 and the presence of attorneys in no way interferes with
the avowed government interest of expediting the flow of bene-
fits to the miners. I00
CONCLUSION
The government has an obvious interest in regulating the
fees awarded to attorneys in black lung cases, but the present
application of the discretionary standards in setting such awards
is proving to be a dangerous path to travel. The officials re-
sponsible for setting the level of awards are interpreting a "rea-
sonable fee" in a wholly unreasonable manner. 01 If the
government has chosen this route to protect claimants from their
own folly of paying attorneys too much, then they have over-
stepped their role. "It is not the function of our Government to
keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the
citizen to keep the Government from falling into error. ' 10 2 Li-
ll The claimant pays only those fees incurred prior to giving notice to the employer
or the director to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund of his condition and need for
benefits. See generally O'Quinn v. The Pittston Co., 4 B.L.R. 1-25 (1981); Yokley v.
Director, 3 B.L.R. 1-230 (1981).
See 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982).
See Republic Steel Corp. v. Director, 590 F.2d 77 (3rd Cir. 1978); Yokley, 3
B.L.R. 1-230.
" See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
" See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
101 See supra note 56.
,02 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950).
ATTORNEYS' FEES
kewise, if the aim is to simplify the process, 03 then a grave
injustice is being exercised against the miners by denying their
right to counsel as mandated by Mathews,1°4 and the benefits
which flow from such representation.05 No matter the intentions,
be they good or bad, of the government in their application of
the present standards,106 the practical result of this course of
action will be the eventual elimination of attorneys from black
lung benefit cases at the expense of claimants' procedural due
process rights.
EARL F. MARTIN III
1o3 Even if there was a semblance of support for this position, administrative fairness
usually does entail "some additional administrative burdens and expense." See Richard-
son v. Wright, 405 U.S. 205, 227 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,o See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
101 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
,o "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning, but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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